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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
THELMA MADSEN and 
DIANA LYNN MADSEN, 
an infant by Thelma 
Madsen, her parent 
and natural guardian, 
A· 12llants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF CORREC-
TIONS, SAMUEL W. SMITH, 
LEON HATCH, TAGE SPONBECK 
and DOE I through DOE V. 
Respondents. 




















BRIEF OF RESPONDE11T STATE OF UTA.B 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death brought by Appel-
lants, the wife and daughter of Thomas Madsen. Thomas Madsen was 
an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time of his death 
and appellants allege that respondents' negligence caused 
Madsen's death. 
DEPOSITION IN THE LOvJER OOURT 
The trial Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District 
Judge, presiding, granted respondents' Motion to Dismiss on 
the grounds that appellants' claim was barred by the Utah Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act. 
- 1 -
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IlliLI SOLGHT ON JI.P"t-~AL 
Respondents se~ to have the· 
motica to disDiss aff:crned and appc 
:der grantins their 
-_nts' appeal denieu. 
S'l".::.T.Llli:UT OF TilE FACTS 
Plaintiff's deceased husband, Thonas 1-ladse,-_, was 
committed to the litah State Prison in July of 1972, on 
the charge of selling dangerous drt.:·,:;. The DE-cedent's 
medical history at the Ctah State Prison showed that he 
had a drug addiction problem of long standing and made 
frequent complaints to people and doctors in and out of 
the prison concerning aches and pains of his back an<: 
joints. As a consequence the decedent m2~e several visits 
to the Veterans Administration Hospital to have these com-
plaints evaluated. Each time the institution concluded that 
his complaints were merely emotional in origin and 
reconunended treaterr.ent. of joint pains with arthritic type 
medication. The decedent had a --~story of making frequent 
reques ·; for drugs to ease his various ills. Notwithstanding, 
this pri .- history of medica' conplaints and probl s the 
decedent ;,.~i not report.- l to sick call the week prior to his 
death nor das there a~y other record of his conplainin~ of 
chest pains. On February 22, 1974, the decedent cafJe to the 
prison dispensary requesting plastic surgery on his nose and 
wrinkles on his face. After thinking it over and getting 
- 2 -
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perr:.ission from the prison psychiatrist, the decedent returr_ d 
on !iarch 1 for hi: clesired sursery. In an:;v1ering the usual 
que· ic~s before · ·.rgery the decedent denieJ any unusual 
aches or pains , shortness of breath, or other symptoms of 
illness. Doctor Teal, the attending physician, found on 
physical examination that the decedent was alert end rational. 
1: fL •: ·.her found there was no evidenc:c of any serious physic c.'.. 
preble·::. 
The decedent underwent this facial surgery under local 
anesthetic without complication. lie received o::ly the 
medications normally given in the prison operating facility. 
Doctor Teal left the ~ospital at 3:00p.m., and found 
the ciecedent to be resting comfortably and to be in good con-
dition. At approxir..ately 6:00 p.m., the decedent experienced 
a brief spell of rapid breathing but otherwise seemed to be 
doing fine. At 8:00p.m., a prison employee working in the 
dispensary contacted a medical assistant and reported that the 
decedent was h·;.v·ing some breathinc.; problc1s. Upon arrival the 
medical assistant cleared the decec.fCnt' s air passage and 
gave him .11._,, to :nouth res-5sci tation which conL .. 1ued until 
an oxygen unit arriv~d. In the meantime the prison physician 
was called and an ambulance was summoned; oxygen continued to 
be aoministered. In addition to t .2 oxygen the medical 
tecl•nician gave the decedent a shot of Epinephrine. The 
decedent was thcn transferred to the Univ~rslty Medical 
Cent0r 1.·.~re he was pronounced duad on arrival. 
- 3 -
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A post~ortem cxawination 'oak plase in which the 
ex -~inins doctor founc' L1at the cause c: C:eath \·.·as acute 
coronary insuf.; .2ncy due to advance coronary atherosclero-
sis with obstruc~ion of the right ant.~ior descending 
coronary arteries (a ma.~r heart attack) There is no~ .ng 
whie;h indicates that t·.c: dec-:dent would not have suffcreci ., 
heart atta-.· even if ti1e sire :ole surgery had not beer1 perforrnec 
Res2ondents me red to dimiss t.he cornpla int befc:···-' the 
trial court. The ·.- ::-ial court g.: anted the motion to c nis 
holding that the Governmental Immunity ll.ct is constitu::iona_ 
and that it prohibits appellants' cau~~ of action. The trial 
court did not reach the question of whether Diana Lynn Mads(,:n 
was a proper plaintiff in light of her failure to comf-'!.Y with 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-12 a. d 63-30-15 (19~3). (T. 88-89; 
45-84). 
POINT I 
THE UTAH GOV' ·::\ENTAL H'U:!UNITY ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. JUDICIAL ST,C..N .. \RDS FOR REVIEHING THE CONSTITUTIC.N-
ALITY OF STATUTES. 
In order to sustain the assertion that the Utah Govern-
mental Ir.ununity Act, Ct. Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et 1· (1953), 
as amended, violates the Constitutions of the Unit- States 
and of Utah, appellants must overcor;1e the strong presur:1pt .>n 
- 4 -
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of constitutional validity that accompanies legislative 
enc.ctrnents. This presumption of validity was clen.rly 
sta'cecl by this Court in Greaves v. State, Utech, 528 P. 2d 
805 (1974), wherein the Court held: 
"In regard to the judicial determination 
of the constitutionality of statutes there 
are certain principles relating to statutory 
construction, to be taken into consideration. 
Because the duty rests upon the court to 
determine the scope of the powers of all three 
branches of government, they have a special 
responsibility to exercise a high degree of 
caution and restraint to keep themselves within 
the limitations of the judicial power in order 
not to infringe upon the prerogatives of the 
executive or the legislative branches. In harmony 
with the policy it is the well-established rule 
that legislative enactments are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity, and they should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which they can be found 
to come within the constitutional framework; 
and that a statute will not be stricken down as 
being unconstitutional unless it appears to be 
so beyond a reasonable doubt. . " (Emphasis added.) 
See also: State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P. 2d 806 (1970). 
Respo·cdents submit that appellants failed to sustain 
the burden necessary to overcome the strong presumption of 
constitutional validity. Appellants have merely cited 
language and dicta to the effect that some judges and 
commentators have found disfavor with certain grants of immu-
nity to certain state and local governments. This type of 
argunent is not sufficient to satisfy the reasonable basic 
standard set forth in Greaves, supra. 
- 5 -
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Secondly, it is a fundamental princi le of constitutio~ 
law that judicial ruling on th~ constitutional v ~idity of 
statutes should be avoided where it is possible to decide the 
case on other grounds. This position was well stoced in 
,; )hnson v. RoLinson, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160 (1974): 
" it is a cardinal principle that 
this Court will first ascertain whether 
a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
b~ which the (constitut: nal) question(s) may 2 
avoided.'" United Stat~3 v. Thirty-Seven 
Photographs, 402 u.s. 363, 91 s.ct. 1400 (1971). 
This Court took the same position in Clinton Citv 
Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 70, 433 P. 20. 7 (1967), wherein it hdd: 
. when a matter may be determined o:·. 
grounds other than the validity of a 
statute or ordin~~ce, it shoul~ be so deter-
mined, and if ~~ can sustain the trial court 
without declari;ly a statute or ordinance 
invalid, it is our duty to do so." 
See also: State v. Tritt, ~3 Utah 2d 365, 463 P. 2d 806 (1970: 
Appellants argue that the Ui..ah Government .·l Inununity Act 
is· unconstitutic1al as a denial of equal protection. Appel-
lants support this argument by contending that a pri:;oner 
treated at the prison hospital has more limited access to the 
courts in case of injury resulting from the treatment than a 
prisoner treated at another state hopsital. This reasoning 
is flawed in several ways. 
First, appellants' argurr .. nt is purely hypothetical. 
It has not been established that Mr. Madsen suf~ered any 
6 -
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ir,j ury uS the result of tJ·ea-Lrner.t at the prison hospital. 
The lower court, in fact, never reached the issue of whether 
ilr. Madsen was injured as a result of treatment received at 
~he prison hospital. Therefore, this court is not properly 
presented with an issue concerning unequal medical treatment 
within the contexts of appeal. 
Second, appellants conclude that a prisoner who 
received injuries as a result of treatment at another state 
hospital would have a cause of action, while a prisoner 
rece~ving ir.juries from treatment at the prison hospital 
would not. This conclusion is unsupported by case law or a 
careful analysis of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (10). Respon-
dents averthat the purpose of subsection (10) is to prevent 
lav1sui ts by inmates against the state when an injury arises 
out of the incarceration of any person. As respondents 
argue in Point II, infra., when the prison has control of 
an inmate, injuries suffered by the inmate "arise out of 
incarceration." 7herefore, whenever an inmate is injured 
in a state hospital regardless of its location, recovery is 
barred by the Government<.>.l In•muni ty Act. 
Third, appellants fail to present a compelling reason 
to abaondon the traditional rational basis test for deter-
mining the constitutionl validity of statutes based on the 
police power of the state. An analysis of the present case and 
applicable statute indicate that iromunity from suit exists 
- 7 -
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.cnever an injury arises out of i' carceration. ~herefore, 
aJpellan ' equal protection a~ ~~ent must fail. 
B. THE UTAH GQ'.:ERN!·1£:;j_',- L IE.: lUNITY ACT IS CotJST ITUTIO: ~l 
The legislative .'nd judicial ilcceptance of the doctrine 
of governmental irrununi::.! is overwhe L11ing. I•Jhile man,· :ris-
dictions, both sL\te ar.d federal, have waived govermc·-":.tal 
irrununity for certain tyJes of suits, few have completely 
abolished the doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court has continually 
reaffirmed acceptance of governmental irrununity and has yet 
to hold ·~at its effect on actions against the D~ited St-~es 
is unconstit~tional. In Kawanakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 
349, 27 S.Ct. 526 (1907), the Court held: 
"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not 
because of any formal conception or abso-
lute theory, but on the logical and practical 
grounds that there can be no legal right as 
against the authority that makes tl,e l.o on 
which the right depends." 
See also Mi: 3ota v. United States. 305 U.S. 382 (1939), 
wherein the Urc.c. ted Sta t>es Supreme Court held that the exempt: or 
of the United States fr-.m being sued without its consent even 
extends to suits by tt~ states,and stated that it rests with 
Congress to determine whether the United States may be sue<J. 
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Un~e~ the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §~ l346(b), 
2671-2680, the United States, like Utah, wo.ives gove ::,ental 
immunity exn.pt in ss;veral specifi:~i areas (see §§ 2674, 2680). 
The United States Supreme Court, in dealing with the constitu-
tionality, objectives, and effects of the ~ct, has always 
maintained the pc -~~~ion that Congress does have the pmver to 
Dalec:.cte v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct., 956 (1953), 
an a ::·.ion was brought against the United States for wrongful 
death under the Federal Tort Claims hct. Indicating its 
acceptance of and deferrence to the legislative purpose of 
Congress, th_e Court said of the Act: 
"Turning to the interpr.tntion of the 
Act, our reasoning as to it~ applicability 
to this disaster starts fro~ the accepted 
jurisprudential principle that no action 
lies against the United States unless the 
legislature has authorized it. The 
language of the Act makes the United 
States liable 'respecting the provisions 
of this title relat~ng to tort claims, 
in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individu~L under 
like circumstances.' 28 u.s.c. § 2674, 
28 u.s.c.A. § 2674. This statute is 
another example of the progressive 
relaxation by legislative enactQents 
cf th,-, rigor of the immunity rule. 
Through such statutes that change the 
law, organized government expresses 
the social purposes that motivate its 
legislation. Of cours", these rr.odi_~jca­
tions are entitled to ~ con5tructi~ 
that w1ll accor·,ollsh tr.e.1.r .ilm, tha; is, 
one that w1ll cLrry out t~e leglslat1ve 
- 9 -
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puroose of allowing suits against the 
Govermr.enL for ncs;ligence v:i tb cue 
regilrd for the s:~atutory c'Xcept·.i_o: .. to 
that policy. In interpreting the 
exceptions to the generality of the 
grant, courts include only those cir-
cumstances which are within the words 
and reason of the exception. They 
cannot do less since petitioners obtain 
their 'right to sue from Congress (and 
they) necessarily must take (that right) 
subject to such restrictions as have 
been imposed. ' Federal Housing 
Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 
251, 60 S.CT. 488, 493, 84 L.Ed. 724. II 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also: Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 u.s. 605, 92 S.CT. 1891 
(1972), and Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350 
u.s. 61, 76 s.ct. 122 (1955). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is very similar 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act because immunity is waived 
for negligent acts of employees except in those areas 
specifically exempted by statute, respondents submit, 
therefore, that the acceptance of this type of statutory 
approach to governmental immunity by the United States 
Supreme Court, supr~, is controlling in the instant case. 
Since Gillmor v. Salt Lake City,32 Utah 180, 89 
Pac. 714 (1907), this Court strongly supported the applica-
tion of the governmental immunity doctrine to suits brought 
against the State of Utah. Citing Gillmor, supra, the 
Court in Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. 
1102 (1924), stated: 
- 10 -
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"The r · nciple o law controlling the 
li~bility ci~ies such cases is lai: 
de ·n in Cilmor v. S· - Lake City, 32 Ut0>, 
1 , 89 P. 71L' .. 12 1 •. \.A. (N.S.), 537, 
wl ce this cou !:". ci t2d with appl'oval tr .. 
foJlowinq quota~ion from 20 A. & E. Enc. 
Law, 1193: 
'The r•1le is ger-.e~ · that a municipal 
corporati• ~ is no~ lial ~ for alleged 
tortious i~juries to the persons or property 
of indiviC~als, when engaged in the perfor-
mance of public or governmental funct:ions or 
duties. So far as municipal corporations 
exercis,~ powers con f-. .:rc.:.:l on tnem for purpo,;es 
essentially pu':l.ic:, ·.:wy stand, as does 
sovereignty \vhose a·.:nts they are, and are not 
liable to be sued fc· any act or omi.ssion 
occu :-ring while i:c tne exercise of ;;1ch powers, 
unless by some s' •.1te the right of action be 
given. And, wherce < .. he part .. cular enterprise 
is purely a matter oE public service for the 
generc•.l and common good, it Qakes no difference 
whether it is mandatory or whether only permitted 
and voluntarily undertaken.'"l Id. at 1102-1103. 
From the earlier cases to the present, this Court has cons~~-
·ntly upheld th~ doctrine of governmental immunity, 
including its application in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, as a viable defense to suit brought against the State. 
l. This langt•age clearly implies '-~'solute i·. cmnity for the 
sovereigP state, and only add~ :;2d the ,overnm~ntal 
versus p .)prietary distinctic.· oecause t>e named defen-
dant was a city corporation. lil any event, the instant 
case involved state prison officers who were clearly 
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See: Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P. 
105 (1960) 2 ; ~mery v. _§tate, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P. 2d 1296 (lg) 
Anderson Investment Con). v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P. 2d: 
(1972); Rosendaal Cr,:"lstruction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28 
Utah 2d 396, 503 P. 2d 446 (1972); Holt v. Utah State ?oad 
Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P. 2d 1286 (1973); Stale Road 
Commission v. Tanner, 30 Utah 2d 19, 512 P. 2d 1022 (1973); 
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 527 P. 2d 651 (1974); ~eenhalgh 
Payson City. Utah, 533 P. 2d 799 (1975)3; and Epting v. ~' 
546 P. 2d 242 (1976). 
On several previous occasions, this Court was presented 
with the identical request presented by appellants in the 
instant case, a request to abolish the Utah Governmental Irnrnun· 
ity Act and the doctrine of governmental immunity as bei J 
unconstitutional, archaic, and no longer viable. On each occ~ 
sian, the Court rejected the position. 
In Davis v. Provo City Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 
P. 2d 415 (1953), the Court stated: 
"The question of whether or not the doctrine 
of immunity from suit when the city is acting in 
its governmental capacity should be discarded en-
tirely hds been considered by this court several times 
with the majority concluding 
2 The Fairclough opinion traces Utah case history up to II 
on the issue of governmental immunity. 
3 As a collateral matter, the Greenhalgh opinion discuss~ 
factors which are considered in determining the diffeu: 
between a governmental and proprietary function and saU. 
that a primary factor is "whether the activity is some~ 
which is done for the general public good and which is 
generally regarded as a public respo~sibili ty" and "w~e: 
there is any special pecuniary beneflt to the (c·lty). 
Clearly, under the above guidelines, the instan~ case 
involved a governmental rather than proprietary funct~ 
- 12 -
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that the matter was properly within the 
province of the legislature. There are 
valid reasons for protecting the munici-
pality from vexations and groundless 
suits; the doctrine of immunity in absence 
of statute is ancient and well-established 
in our law; and limits of liability can be 
imposed by the legislature where we are 
powerless to do so. For these reasons we 
believe that the doctrine must be enforced 
until the time when the legislature takes 
action providing for the bringing of suits 
not encompassed in U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-77." 
Likewise, in Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d 
463 (1955), the Court held: 
"From time to time certain judicial 
expressions have been uttered questioning 
the soundness of that rule as a matter of 
policy. Whatever its desireability or 
undesireability may be, it has long been 
firmly established in our law by rulings 
of the majority of this court. In deference 
to stare decisis, we do not now feel at 
liberty to consider its merits or demerits. 
Any change would be properly with the pro-
vince of the Legislature." 
In Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P. 2d 464 
(1964), in responding to a plaintiff's contention that the 
doctrine of governmental immunity should be changed, the Court 
held in a per curiam decision: 
"With due deference to the authorities 
cited, and the reasoning set forth by them 
we are not persuaded of the propriety of 
judicially changing this rule, which is 
adhered to by a majority of our sister 
states. See Anno. 86 A.L.R. 2d 480, et seq. 
It has always been the law of this state 
and the activities, operations and contracts 
of the state government and other public 
-13 -
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entities protccte2 by it are bosed upon that 
undersl._:cding of _,,_, laH. For the rea:.ons 
set fort_;1 in the ;cs heretofore deci ~d by 
this court referr to a~ove, we believe that 
if there is to be a change which would have 
such an important effect unon pub~ic insti-
tutions and their operatio ;s, it s:wuld be 
left en' ~rely to the legislature to determine 
whether · -" imrn.uni ty should be renoved; and 
as to wha~ age•· ~i,~; when e~fective, and to 
wha+: extent, if a;,,, limite~ :io1·; should be 
prescribed." Id. at 465. 
Likev1ise, in Wile- v. Salt City Coin., 26 Uta~ 
2d 78, 484 P. 2d 1200 (1971), a plaintiff asserted, as in t~ 
instant case, that the Utah Governll'_ent3.l Immunity Ac'::. should 
be c' _)lished altogether". • as being archaic and doing so 
judicially to legislate our Gover:n<1ent Immunity Act out of 
ezi.stence." Justice Henriod, with Justices Callister, Tuckett, 
Ellett, and Crockett concurring, res?onded: 
"This last contention we are 
not inclined to espouse, ir, spite 
of a claimed trend in that direction, 
noted by plaintiffs' adversions to 
scholarly papers written by eminent 
educators, and tt.• judicl. l pronounce-
ments of some sis" ;r stat.'s." 
Counsel for appellants doing nothing new, and i - doing 
nothing more than seeking judie 1 legislation, which the 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to condone. 
This Court has also cited sound policy reasons for 
supporb • the doctrine of gove •_-r,mental immunity. In 
Blonqu~>t v. Surnm _County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 481 P.2d 430 
--------
(1971), the Court noted: 
- 14 -
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"It is of great importance to public 
~fficials, to the governmental unit they act 
1n behalf of, and even more important to the 
stability and efticiency of government, that 
public officials should not be held liable for 
damages for acts done in good faith in the per-
formance of their duties where the exercise of 
any discretion is involved even though they may 
make a mistake in judgment. The general law is 
quite uniformly to that effect. 
* * * It would be quite impractical and 
unfair to require them to act at their own 
risk. This would not only be disruptive of the 
proper functioning of public institutions, 
but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and re-
sponsible persons from accepting the responsi-
bilities of public office. Accordingly, it is 
the settled policy of the law that when a public 
official acts in good faith, believing what he does 
to be within the scope of his authority and in the 
line of his duty, he is not liable for damages 
even if he makes a mistake in the exercise of his 
judgment." 483 P. 2d at 434, 436. 
Likewise, in Sheffield v. Turner, 2 Utah 2d 314, 
445 P. 2d 367 (1968), the Court stated that there is: 
. the imperative need for those able 
in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable 
freedom to discharge the burdensome responsibil-
ities of keeping in confinement and maintaining 
discipline of a large number of men who have been 
convicted of serious crime. If such officials are 
too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward 
which may happen to inmates a number of evils fol-
low, including a breakdown of discipline, and the 
fact that capable persons would be discouraged 
from taking such public positions." 
An additional policy concern was expressed in McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., Sec. 53.24: 
"The reason (for immunity) as often ex-
pressed, is one of public policy, to pro-
tect public funds and public property. 
"Taxes are raised for 
- 15 -
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certain spr·:ific crovernmentill p\ 'J'o•'s; 
and 1 if thL i c;OU ' be r~ l VE'rted ,](.' 
payment ,,,r: '-r~; c!-,~\\age cl2im ·, t _·ore 
import ·.·:ork <·:: governme~ 1- · i.ch E'Very 
munici~~ ~y msst p:rfarm I 1arJless of 
its othc relations, would je seriously 
impairec if not totc.lly desc:royed. '" 
Respondents s.bmit that there are additional compelling 
rea .. 1s for retention of immunity in situations sucL .. os 
the l~stant case. The rr0]~rn trend in corrections is to 
reha1 llitate inmates thro~ ' vocational and educational 
tr ,, ining programs. 1ilork release, school release, home 
vi~~ts, probation and pa;ole are current methods t .~d. 
It is a practical impossibility to pro>ide twenty-
fo, h:,ur guard supervision of inmates on such programs. 
Thus, if governmental immunity is not applied to protect 
these programs, they· will have to be terminated. Sec:·;dlv, 
the i:rmnuni ty frees the correctional eJ,l.ployees from the fear 
of retaliation so as to allow them to function freely and 
give independent discharge of their duties, as stated in 
Sheffield. 
Men· · ·m should be made of appellants' use of Brown 
v. l'!ichita ~·tate Univ( ~_!_y_, 217 Kan. 279, 540 P. :d 66 
(1975). The case was ted for the proposition that t:1e 
1\ans _ o: :pn···e Court voided the ·, •nscts legislative 
provi:c:ions rc,•garding gove nmental immunity aS a violation 
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o£ equal protection. ~ carerul reading of the case reveals 
that the only provi~ voided w~rc those dealing with the 
proprietary activiti~~ ~f goverr~ent, i.e., those activities 
carried on forth·~ specific benefit of a lr:cal cormnunity 
or which . re generally :rforrned by the private sector 
for profit. 
"Having declared the doctrine 
governmental inmunity as coclified 
in K.S.A. 46-901, 902 to be consti 
tutionally void, equality ret~cns in 
regard to the responsibility " all levels 
of government in this state -~ 
engaged in oroorietarv activ: :es. 
Ho1rever, by '-'r::ualizing respo:=.·s::_;Jility 
we are confro~ted ~ith the fical 
question pre~2nted in this appeal. Is 
the transpor~ing of football players, 
university personnel and interested 
alumni to a scheduled intercolleg i.ate 
away football game a govern~ental or 
proprietary function?" (Em~hasis added.) 
The Kansas Suprc:.;ne Court went on to state its acceptance of 
the doctrine of governmental irmnunity v1ith respect to 
governmental activities, i.e., goverr~ental activity 
carried on for the common good of the general public (e.g., 
the maintenance and operation of a state correctional facility). 
"Nevrrtheless, we believe the 
governme::tal-o>:oor ieta rv disti nctio_r 
still has vi tc-.: ~-~· Implicit in t' · 
distinction is ·~e recognition that 
it 'is not a to:.·t for govermr.ent to 
govern. ' (Jackson, J., dissenting in 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 
57, 73 S.Ct. 956, 979, 9/ L. Ed. 1427.) 
Deoendi• ' uool! the faci:s and circumstances 
in~olved; the distinction can serve either 
- 17 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to place go?er~~e~t in the shoes of the 
private tortfe~sor, or to li~it govern-
ment liabilit~. For example, under the 
distinction the state is not exposed to 
liability as to legislative or lUdicial 
action or inaction, or administrative 
action or inaction, of a legislative or 
judlclal cast. Nor is the state liable 
in matters involving the exercise of 
official judgment or dlscretion. 
(Willis, et al v. Dept. of Cons. & Ec. 
Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34. See Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 95 s.ct. 99-2-,--
43 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1975).)" (Emphasis added.) 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953), which limits immunity 
to governmental functions. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' c;;.USE OF ACTION .ii.ROSE OUT OF AN 
INCARCERATION AND THE STATE OF UTAH IS, 
THEREFORE, IMl.:UNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN., § 63-30-10 (10) (1953). 
As indicated in Point I, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act should be judicially construed so as to 
preserve the presumption of sovereign immunity intended 
by the legislature. 
Utilizing this strict standard of construction, 
an examination must be made of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (10). 
That statute provides, as follows: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or ommission of 
- 18 -
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a~ employee committed within the scope of 
h~s employment except if the injury: 
(10) arises out of the incarceration 
of any person in any state prison, county 
or city jail or other place of legal con-
finement •.•. " (Emphasis Added.) 
Respondents submit that the language of Subsection (10) is 
clear on its face and was intended to preclude suits 
against the state in situations such as the present case. 
In the alternative, respondents submit that the meaning 
of the terms "arises out of," incarceration;" and "other 
place of legal confinement;" must be strictly construed by 
this Court with a presumption in favor of preserving 
governmental immunity, as set forth in Point I. 
Appellants concede that Hr. !l!adsen was legally 
confined in the State Prison at the time of his death. 
A prison is not just four walls with bars on the windows. 
Other basic functions essential to the sustaining of man 
are required to be performed for persons confined in a 
prison. Facilities for food preparation and medical 
attention as well as facilities for exercising the body 
and mind are part of the prison. 
Respondents submit that occurrences in the various 
suboperations necessary for a complete prison facility 
are also covered by a statute providing for injuries 
arising out of incarceration of persons at a state prison. 
- 19 -
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Several recent Utah cases have shed judicial 
light on Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-10 (10). In a 1976 
Utah case, Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 24.2 (1976), this 
Court was faced with the question of whether a murder 
committed by an escaped prisoner from a work-release 
program arose "out of the incarceration 
. in any 
state prison, ••. or other place of legal confinement." 
The Court held the state immune from suit arising out 
of this incident. 
Although the Court chose to base its holding on 
subsection 1 of Section 63-30-10 and held the state 
immune becuase the supervision of a work-release program 
arose out of the exercise of a discre~ionary function, 
Justice Crockett commented that Paragraph 10 might also 
be applicable. In speaking to the point of whether the 
escaped convict inflicted injuries \'lhich arose out of 
incarceration in the s~ate prison, Justice Crockett stated: 
• • As to the status of Michael Hart 
vis-a-vis the state prison, there seem to be 
just two alternatives, either: (a) He had 
totally escaped the control of the prison 
and was thus acting on his own so the 
prison was not responsible for him; or 
(b) he was still under the control of 
the prison authorities so that his conduct 
would 1 arJ.se out of the J.ncarceL·atJ.on of 
any person in (the) state prison .... 1 
- 20 -
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in which latter instance the prison is 
inunune from suit under the statute." 
(Emphasis added.) (546 P.2d at 244) 
Justice Crockett seems to be saying that where a prisoner 
is still under control of prison authorities, incidents 
thereto "arise out of incarceration," and the state is 
immune from suit as per Section 63-30-10(.10). In 
Sheffield v. Turner, supra, the Court was faced with 
deciding whether Warden Turner of the state prison was 
immune under Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10(10), for 
injuries to an inmate within the prison. In this case, 
Chief Justice Crockett stated: 
"Inasmuch as the statutes just referred 
to plainly retain sovereign immunity to the 
state for any injury arising out of incarcera-
tion in the prison, the trail court correctly 
dismissed the complaint as to it •••• " 
(Id. at 368) 
Another Utah case dealing with Section 63-30-10(10), 
Utah Code Annotated, is Emery v. State of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 1, 
483 P.2d 1296 (1971), in which this Court decided whether 
or not a state hopsital qualified as "another place of 
legal confinement." Justice Henroid stated that the Court 
was of the opinion that, in reading the whole section, 
the words "other place of legal confinement" obviously 
referred to something other than a jail or state prison, 
including a hospital where one cannot be released without 
- 21 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
some kind of permission. Surely, a private person volun-
tarily undergoing surgery within a prison facility must 
also fall within this provision, thus the state is immune 
from suit. 
Respondents assert under such circumstances that the 
state prison and all the necessary auxiliary functions 
thereof, including the operation of the prison hospital, 
are governmental functions under the definition provided 
in Point VII, infra, and the cases therein. Consequently, 
the performance of the duties incident thereto are 
protected by the traditional rule of sovereisn immunity. 
Such protection does not constitute a complete 
shield for anything that may be done or permitted in prison. 
In Sheffield v. Turner, supra, the Court held that the warden 
and other prison officers are protected by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity against claims of negligence so long as 
they are acting within the scope of their duties and in good 
faith, and that they could not be held liable unless they 
were guilty of some conduct which transcended the bounds of 
good-faith performance of their duty by a willful or a 
malicious wrongful act which they know, or should have kno~, 
would result in injury. 
- 22 -
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This analysis of subsection 10, provides an inter-
pretation which protects the State under sovereign immunity, 
and permits liability only against individuals whose conduct 
transcends the bounds of good faith performance of a duty 
at the prison. 
Based on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10), appellants 
have no cause of action because the government has not waived 
immunity for negligent acts or omissions of employees which 
were committed within the scope of their employment where 
the resulting injury arose out of the person's incarceration 
in the state prison. 
POINT III 
THE INJURY TO MR. MJI.DSEN IS WITHIN THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SUBSECTION 10 OF SECTION 
63-30-10 AND THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE STJI.TUTE. 
Appellants allege in Point III of their brief that the legis-
lative history of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (1953) 
compels a narrow reading of subsection (10). Respondents 
submit that the dialogue quoted by appellants reveals a 
decision by the legislature to protect the state from law-
suits exactly like the present one. The comment by 
Senator Welch which is quoted and underlined at page 26 of 
- 23 -
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appellants' brief logically refers to claims by inmates that 
they received improper treatment at the prison hospital. 
This reference is especially reasonable when the alleged 
mistreatment is a discretionary matter involving medical 
judgment. Under the circumstances of this case where 
Mr. Madsen requested surgery and did not inform the operating 
physicians or medical technician of any unusual chest pains 
or prior heart problems the resultant medical treatment was 
reasonable and should not subject the state to liability 
because of Mr. Madsen's death. 
Appellants cite Sheffield v. Turner, 2. Ut. 2d 314, 
445 P.2d 367 (1968) to show that gcvernrnental immunity "does 
not constitute a carte blanche protection for anything that 
may be done or permitted in a prison." Respondents agree 
with that proposition. If a guard brutally assaults an 
inmate governmental immunity offers no protection. If a 
medical technician or physician is recklessly or grossly 
negligent in treating an inmate governmental immunity may 
not shield such treatment. 
Respondents contend, however, that the conduct in 
this case was clearly "the performance of duties incident 
(to a governmental function)" and therefore covered by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
- 24 -
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT STATE \'lAS PERFORMING A 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AS PER UTAII 
CODE ANN, § 63-30-10 (1) (1953) I AND, 
THEREFORE, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953) as 
amended reads, in part: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or ommission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his 
employment except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above statute provides immunity from the types of 
activity alleged by appellants. 
Judicial interpretation of what constitutes a 
discretionary function when performed by public officials 
has been extensive across the country. 
Decisions on this issue have been influenced by the 
purposes of the sovereign immunity doctrine as mentioned i~ 
Point I. For example: In NeCasek v. City of Los Angeles, 
233 Cal. App.2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965), it was said: 
"Since obviously no mechanical 
separation of all activities in which 
public officials may engage as being 
either discretionary or ministerial 
is possible, the determination of the 
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category into which a particular activity 
falls should be g~ided by the purpose of 
the discretionar immunity doctr1.ne." 
Emphas1.s added.). 
In Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1965), the 
Court defined the discretionary function as being an 
activity done within the framework of official duty 
"involving exercise of discretion which public policy 
requires be made without fear of personal liability." 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Court followed the above mentioned line of case 
in Sheffield v. Turner, supra, where an inmate at the state 
prison injured another inmate. The Court recognized the need 
for supervisors at the prison to be free to discharge the 
burdensome responsibilities of supervising confinement and 
maintaining discipline without being susceptible to lawsuits 
covering every activity of such men in a pressure-filled 
situation. 
A leading case dealing with the meaning of the word 
"discretion" as it applies to sovereign immunity is 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 965 (1953). 
There, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting 
Section 2680 of the Federal Tort Claims Act (which, in 
part, reads: "any claim • . . based upon the exercise or 
performance of a discretionary function or duty on the part 
of . . . an employee of the Government . . 
is exempt from governmental liability), held that acts done 
- 26 -
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at the "planning" level were "discretionary," whereas those 
done at the "operational" level were not. The Court, however, 
went on to specify what type of governmental acts went into 
the "planning" level by specifically holding that the negli-
gent acts in question (i.e., fertilizer bag labeling, 
determining bag temperature, coating of fertilizer, and 
bagging) done by government employees were themselves 
"planning" and thus "discretionary" since they "involved 
considerations more or less important to the practicality of 
the Government's fertilizer program" and were pursuant to the 
basic plan established by the "Field Director's Office." 
The Court said: 
. the discretionary function or duty 
. includes more than the initiation of 
programs and activities. It also includes 
determinations made by executives or admin-
istrators in establishing plans, specifica-
tions, or schedules of operations. Where 
there is room for policy judgment and 
decision there is discretion. It necessarily 
follows that acts of subordinates in carrying 
out the operations of government in accordance 
with official directions cannot be actionable. 
If it were not so, the protection of Section 
2680 (a} would fail at a time it would be 
needed, that is, when a subordinate performs 
or fails to perform a causal step, each action 
or nonaction being directed by the supervisor, 
exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion." 
Id. at 36. (Emphasis added.) 
Dalehite v. United States, supra, represents a definite 
line of cases which hold that governmental activity 
pursuant to or connected with the basic policy decisons 
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at the "planning" level is itself "planning" and thus within 
the confines of "discretionary" immunity. In Downs v. 
United States, 382 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), in an 
action against the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act arising out of an incident of air piracy in which 
two people were kille~ the Court, relying on Dalehite, supra, 
stated: 
"Despite the growing conviction that 
the sovereign, like others, should be 
accountable £or its wrongs, it seems 
clear that the conduct of certain types 
of governmental activity must remain free 
from the effects of litigation. Basically, 
the exemption for discretionary functions 
seeks to insulate from judicial inquiry 
the propriety of basic policy decisions 
made by officials of coordinate branches 
of government in whom are vested b:coad anC. 
pervasive decision-making responsibility. 
The rule contemplates those situations in 
which a court cannot undertake to determine 
the reasonableness of complex governmental 
decisions. Also, implicit in the concept 
of protection for discretionary acts is 
the probable effect which potential liability 
would have in dampening the ardor of those 
charged with the formulation and execution 
of governmental programs. The t.est for 
immunity, then, should be whether injury 
inflicted as a result of government action 
can be subjected to judicial review without 
thereby jeopardizing the quality and effi-
ciency of government itself. 
"Under these standards, it is clear that 
the substance of any hijacking plan or procedure 
formulated by the Department of Justice 
through theFBI or its executive officials could 
not be the subject of civil litigation under 
the Tort Claims Act. This would be true 
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even though the plan called for activity 
clearly negligent adjudged by traditional 
tort principles. Horeover, in order to 
achieve the purposes for which exempt~on 
from liability is deemed necessary, it is 
obvious 1 that a'cts of subordinates in 
carry1ng out the operations of government 
in accordance with official directions 
cannot be actionable.' Daleh~te v. United 
States, supra, 346 u.s. at 36, 73 s.ct. at 968. 
Thus, as urged by the Government, it is 
of no real moment that the allegedly negli-
gent governmental agents in this case were 
operating at the 'field' level rather than at 
policy-making level." (Emphasis added.} 
In Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713 
N.D. 111, 1955}, in an action under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, the United States District Court held that any 
activity of a government employee at the operational level 
performed in accordance with the official plan or program 
constitutes performance of a discretionary function since 
its source is discretionary. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Baker v. Straumfjard, 
10 Ore. App. 414 500 P.2d 496 (1972), held that a state 
employed doctor was immune under the state immunity statute 
since the following acts, which the plaintiff alleged to 
be the source of liability, were within the "discretionary" 
function: 
a. Admitting plaintiff to the state university 
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b. Failing to supervise, guard, or attend him. 
In Jarret v. Willis. 235 Ore. 51, 383 J0.2d 995 (196 3), 
an actio:~ was brought against the superintendent of a home 
for the mentally deficient as the result of injuries inflicted 
on the plaintiff by a resident on leave. The Court held that 
both the granting of leave of absence to the resident and 
the superintendent's failure to provide adequate means of 
supervision over the resident while on leave were within 
the "discretionary" function of the superintendent. 
The Court stated: 
"His responsibilities require him to make 
constant discretionary judgment. Like the 
Board of Parole and Probation or the Superin~ 
tendent of the State Hospital, he is required 
as the State's keeper of these unfortunates 
and in behalf of the state, to judge and 
govern human beings and human conduct, a 
judgment devoid of any of the standard weights 
and measures available for the decisions made 
by other public officials. There would be few 
of his decisions that would not be discretionary." 
Respondents submit that the subjective element in 
treating and rehabilitating prisor:,~rs requires almost a 
total concentration of effort in discretionary functions, 
including, as in the instant case, allowing a prisoner to 
undergo a personally requested'surgical procedure. 
Medical treatment rendered by hospital personnel is 
of necessity discretionary in nature. Broad guidelines for 
care can be provided but specific treatment' can only be 
given in the context of specific medical circumstances. 
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Since appellants h~ve not even alleged that the action 
of respondents were deliberate and in wanton disregard of 
definite rules of medical conduct, the alleged cause of 
action fails under subsection 10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-30-10, which retains immunity for injuries 
caused by an employee acting within the scope of his employ-
ment when it arises out of the exercise of a discretionary 
function, even if such discretion is abused. 
POINT V 
OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL FACILITY AT THE 
STATE PRISON IS A GOVERUMENTAL FUNCTION 
WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNHENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
This Court has considered in several opinions the dis-
tinctive criteria which determine what is a governmental 
versusa proprietary function and, hence, what type of 
activities carried on by a government entity are covered by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In the recent case of 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 533 P.2d 799 (1975), this Court 
held that an operation of a hospital facility by a municipa-
lity is a proprietary function not covered under the Govern-
mental Immunity Act. In this case, the Court reiterated four 
important factors to consider in deciding whether an activity 
is proprietary or governmental. The factors are: 
1. Whether the activity is something which is done 
for the general public good; 
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2. >Vhether it is generally regarded as a public 
responsibility; 
3. >Vhether there is any special pecuniary benefit 
to the municipality; and 
4. >Vhether it is of such a nature as to be 
in competition with free enterprise. 
It is undisputed that the operation of a prison faciU~ 
by the state government is a governmental function. 
Therefore, the only issue before the court is whether the 
operation of a prison hospital meets the four criteria set 
down by the Supreme Court. In the Sheffield case, supra, 
this Court noted "the imperative need for those in a super-
visory capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the 
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and 
maintaining discipline of a large number of men who have 
been convicted of serious crime." Respondents assert that 
a prison warden in the exercise of his discretion in running 
a prison hospital is doing so for the general public good. 
The public good would seem to be best served if the prison 
warden and the prison physicians were allowed to make their 
independent judgments as to what type of medical attention 
is to be given to individual inmates and where such treatment 
should be given. 
The second criterion given by the Court is whether 
the disputed activity is generally regarded as a public 
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responsibility. The operation of a prison facility is clearly 
a public responsibility, and it follows that the adminis-
tration of the various programs and facilities within that 
prison also are public responsibilities. 
In the case of Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 
279 P.2d 463 (1955), from which the court in Greenhalgh, 
supra, extracted its four criteria, the Court noted that 
"where the activity is otherwise consistent with the govern-
mental function, the fact that a fee is exacted, nor that 
there may be some incidental pecuniary benefit to the city, 
are by themselves controlling." A fortiori, if some pecuniary 
benefit can be received by the governmental entity and still 
pass this test, then the fact that no fees are extracted, 
or pecuniary benefit is derived by the state from the 
administration of this hospital, there can be no doubt 
that the third criterion has been met. 
The last criterion is whether the activity is of such 
~ nature as to be in competition with free enterprise. The 
state prison hospital is not in competition with any part 
of the free enterprise system, as there is nothing in the 
private sector that specializes in the treatment of people 
who have been removed from society by the court system and 
the legislature. The prison authorities have, in their 
discretion, found it desirable and beneficial to the public 
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to maintain a state facility for treatment of inma~es' 
medical problems. Due to the unique patients at this 
hospital, prison authorities are best suited for deter-
mining how to best meet the prisoner's medical needs. 
In no sense can it be said that in operating a 
prison hospital, the state is trying to obtain some pecuniary 
benefit in competition with the private sector. 
Based on the guidelines given by the Supreme Court 
in Rami~, supra, and reiterated in Greenhalgh, supra, it 
is clear that the operation of a prison hospital within the 
prison is strictly a governmental function as is the opera-
tion of the state prison itself, and is thus covered by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. This conclusion is supported 
in Sheffield,supra, where the Court noted that, "there can 
be no question but that the maintenance of the state prison 
and the keeping of prisoners therein is a necessary auxiliary 
of government, and, therefore, a governmental function, and 
the performance of the duties incident thereto would normally 
be protected by the traditional rule of sovereign immunity." 
(445 P.2d at 368) 
In light of the above language, the discretionary 
actions of prison medical employees are immune as provided 
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POINT VI 
RESPONDENTS SAMUEL H. SHITH, LEON HATCH, 
TAGE SPONDECK, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 5 WERE 
ACTING tVITHIN THE BOUNDS OF GOOD FAITH IN 
PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES AND ARE THUS 
IMMUNE FROM SUIT. 
Respondents submit that three recent Utah cases 
that deal with suits against government entities and their 
employees in their private capacities provide immunity to 
respondents in the instant case for the types of activities 
alleged by appellants. In the case of Sheffield v. Turner, 
21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968), already discussed, 
the court held that the prison warden and other prison 
officers are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
against claims of negligence, so long as they are acting 
in good faith and within the scope of their duties. Sheffield 
also indicated that they could not be held liable unless 
they were guilty of some conduct which transcended the 
bounds of good-faith peformance of their duties by a willful 
or malicious wrongful act which they knew or should have 
known would result in injury. The court reasoned that to 
subject such officials to lawsuits for anything which may 
happen to inmates would create a number of evils, including 
a breakdown of discipline and the likelihood that capable 
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In the case of Rosendaal, supr~, in which a 
taxpayer was ~inging suit against the members of the State 
Tax Commission in their private capa,:ities, the Court held: 
"It appears from the record in this 
case that defendants in the matters herein 
complained of by the plaintiff were 
pursuing their duties in the collection of 
excise taxes the defendants claim to be 
due the state. It also appears that the 
acts complained of were performed in good 
faith by the defendants and within the 
statutory authority granted. The ruling 
of the court below that the defendants 
are not subject to suit for damages in 
their private capacity is correct." (Id. 
at 448) 
In a 1972 Utah case, Anderson Investment Corporation 
v. the State of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972), 
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin rr.·cmbers of the State 
Road Commission from proceeding to work on a viaduct before 
theplaintiff had been paid the appropriate dollar damages 
from his alleged diminution in value of easements to light 
and air. In Anderson, the Court held: 
"In the instant suit, Anderson did 
make the individual members of the com-
mission parties defendants. • • • These 
members in the performance of their duties 
which have the same immunity as does the 
commission which they constitute." (Id. 
at 146) 
The above three cases clearly point out that 
appellants improperly brought suit against the individual 
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membe~s named in this action, since they have not alleged 
that any of the named respondents was guilty of any conduct 
which transcended the bounds of good-faith performance of 
their duties by a willful and malicious wrongful act which 
they knew or should have known would have resulted in the 
injury complained of. The individuals named as party 
respondents were properly dismissed by the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, appellants have cited substantial case 
authority, dicta, and commentary supporting the proposition 
that absolute governmental immunity is archaic and without 
legal foundation. The Utah Legislature took this same 
position many years ago when it enacted the Utah Governmen-
tal Immunity Act. The Act severed legal tradition by waiving 
governmental immunity in many areas of governmental activity, 
including the negligence of its own employees while retaining 
immunity in certain areas deemed necessary by the legislature. 
This same approach is followed by the United States in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act and by the v~st majority of the 
states. Appellants have cited no controlling authority 
requiring the complete abolition of the governmental immunity 
doctrine and have failed to overcome the strong presumption 
favoring the constitutionality of legislative enactments. 
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This, coupled with this Court's traditional acceptance of 
the governmental immunity doctrine in general and the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, specificially indicates that the 
Act is constitutional and controlling in the instant case. 
It should be noted that this Court was presented 
with the identical legal claims in Epting v. State, supra, 
in a petition for rehearin~ This rehearing was denied. 
Likewise, the same constitutional challenge was brought in 
the Fourth Judicial District in Utah County in the case of 
Mitchell v. State of Utah, (Civil N. 42, 647, 4th District 
Court of Utah, July 14, 1976) with the same result. In 
both instances above, the courts were presented with identi-
cal issues, case authority, etc. as is before this court, 
challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and thus stare decisis dictates that appellants' 
claim has already been decided in respondents' favor. 
Therefore, appellants' appeal should be denied, and the lower 
court decision affirmed. 
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G. Blaine Davis 
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